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I. BACKGROUND
During the Obama administration, there has been a strong shift
toward indicting and trying terrorism-related crimes in Article III
Courts. While this development raises many evidentiary issues for both
the prosecution and defense, this article will focus on the use of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 ("Rule 15") as amended in 2012 in
terrorism cases.
In order to fully understand the current case law, one needs to first
look at the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which states, "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." 2 In 2004, the Supreme Court
in Crawford v. Washington held that the Confrontation Clause is a
procedural guarantee that applies to testimonial evidence and is meant to
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I See Jessica K. Weigel, Hearsay and Confrontation Issues Post-Crawford: The
Changing Course of Terrorism Trials, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1488, 1489 (2014).
2 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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ensure the reliability of evidence through the requirement of witness
cross-examination.3 While Justice Scalia limited the standard under
Crawford to testimonial evidence, the Court declined to clearly define
what "testimonial" meant. Justice Scalia made it clear however, that
unless a witness was unavailable and there had been a prior opportunity
for cross-examination, there was a bar to admitting testimonial
statements.4
Rule 15 addresses the use of depositions in criminal cases. In 2012,
it was amended to add subsection (c)(3) to provide for pre-trial
depositions abroad, outside the presence of a defendant. Since 2012,
Rule 15 has been used by both the Government and defendants in
terrorism related trials to attempt to obtain pre-trial depositions of
witnesses outside the United States. Although Rule 15 is specific to
depositions, Rule 15's requirements also have been applied in
determining whether to allow witnesses to testify at a U.S. trial via live
closed circuit video feed from a foreign location.
This article examines how Article III courts are currently applying
the Rule 15 analysis in different witness testimony situations. It first
addresses the Rule 15 requirements and then delves into the Rule 15
methodology by reviewing recent case law to identify the approach and
direction courts are taking with regard to its use.
II. RULE 15 REQUIREMENTS AND GENERAL PRACTICALITIES
Depositions are generally disfavored in criminal cases and are only
to be utilized to preserve evidence for trial; they are not for discovery
purposes.5  Further, the burden for establishing the exceptional
circumstances to take a deposition as required under Rule 15 is on the
moving party.6 Rule 15(a) states that "a party may move that a
prospective witness be deposed in order to preserve testimony for trial.
The court may grant the motion because of exceptional circumstances
and in the interest of justice."7 Courts have consistently held that in
order to meet the burden of "exceptional circumstances," the moving
party must show that the testimony is material and the witness is
3 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4 Id. at 68. For the development of case law defining "testimonial," see Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011); Williams.
V. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
See U.S. v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1993); see also U.S. v. Little, No.
12 Cr. 647, 2014 WL 1744824, at*2 (S.D.N.Y, Apr. 23, 2014).
See Drogoul, 1 F.3d at 1553.
7 FED. R. CRnw. P. 15.
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unavailable to testify at trial.8 For evidence to be material, the testimony
would either have to exculpate the defendant, if offered by the defendant,
or inculpate the defendant if offered by the Government.9 Additionally,
while such testimony need not be definitive proof of guilt or innocence,
it must be more than just relevant, it cannot be cumulative of other
evidence, and it must be admissible.'o Under Rule 15, for a witness to be
"unavailable" the moving party is required to show that the witness is
unable or unwilling to attend trial and that the moving party has made a
good faith effort to obtain the witness's presence." Generally speaking,
foreign witnesses outside of a party's subpoena power who refuse to
travel or cannot travel to the United States are considered "unavailable"
as long as the moving party provides more than vague assertions that the
witness will not travel to the United States and the moving party has
made a good faith attempt to get the witness to come to the United
States.12
But, since the Confrontation Clause ensures that an accused has the
right to confront witnesses against him, Rule 15(c)(3) requires case-
specific findings in order to prevent ex-parte evidence from being used
against a defendant.1 3 The five requirements are as follows:
(1) the witness's testimony could provide substantial proof of a
material fact; (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the witness's
attendance at trial cannot be obtained; (3) a deposition of the witness in
the U.S. cannot be obtained; (4) for an in-custody defendant, secure
transportation and continuing custody cannot be assured at the witness's
location; and (5) the defendant can meaningfully participate in the
deposition through reasonable means.14
In determining whether to permit depositions, various courts utilize a
checklist analysis for the "totality of circumstances" which includes (a)
whether the Rule 15 motion is timely made, (b) whether the deponents
are available for trial, (c) whether the purpose of the deposition is for
discovery or for use at trial; (d) whether the anticipated testimony is
material; (e) whether the safety of U.S. officials who would be traveling
to the foreign deposition location might be compromised, which
8 See U.S. v. Al Fawwaz, No. S7 98 Crim. 1023, 2014 WL 627083, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 18, 2014); see also U.S. v. Moalin, No. 10CR4246-JM, 2012 WL 3637370, at *2
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012) and U.S. v. Abu Ghayth, No. S14 98 CRIM. 1023, 2014 WL
144653, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2014).
9 See Al Fawwaz, 2014 WL 627083, at *1; Moalin, 2012 WL 3637370, at *2; Abu
Ghayth, 2014 WL 144653, at *2.
to Id.
it Id.
12 See Al Fawwaz, 2014 WL 627083, at *1; Abu Ghayth, 2014 WL 144653, at *2.
13 U.S. v. Mostafa, 14 F.Sup.3d 515, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
14 See Id. at 519; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(c)(3).
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especially is a consideration if a defendant is the party requesting the
foreign deposition; and (f) whether the procedures to be used in the
foreign country, as to reliability and trustworthiness, are compatible with
our fundamental issues of fairness.'5
From a practical standpoint, parties need to deal with issues related
to foreign governments when making Rule 15(c)(3) motions. Often the
party will need to request in its motion that the court issue 'letters
rogatory.' These are essentially the manner in which one country
requests assistance from a foreign country, via methods of court
procedure present in both countries. Letters rogatory are often issued in
order to assist with obtaining Rule 15(c)(3) depositions or live
testimony. 6
Additionally, parties and courts need to address how to ensure the
testimony is trustworthy and that the method of deposition permitted by
the foreign country still enables the defendant to "meaningfully
participate" in the process, thus guaranteeing his Sixth Amendment right
of confrontation. Generally speaking, this threshold is met if (a) a
witness will testify under oath, (b) a 2-way live contemporaneous video
feed where both the witness and defendant can see each other is used, (c)
the defendant has attorneys present at the deposition location as well as
with him, (d) the defendant can communicate with his attorneys on
location, and (e) a videographer and stenographer record the
proceeding. 7 While this scenario appears to be the basic ideal standard,
with the Court observing in real time to rule on objections, sometimes a
foreign country will not permit testimony to be taken in this manner. In
those cases the court will have to evaluate whether what is permitted by
the particular jurisdiction is enough to establish the testimony will be
reliably truthful and that the defendant has his rights protected.'
15 Moalin, 2012 WL 3637370, at *2-*6.
16 See Al Fawwaz, 2014 WL 627083, at *2.
U.S. v. Ahmed, No. 12-CR-661 SLT S-2, 2014 WL 7399298, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
30, 2014).
See, e.g., U.S. v. Cooper, 947 F. Supp.2d 108 (D.D.C. 2013), in which the
Indonesian officials who approved the taking of the depositions were requiring that both
the Government and defense provide the foreign magistrate with a list of their questions
and topics prior to the deposition. The magistrate would initially ask the witness
questions. It was eventually negotiated between the Government and the Indonesian
official in charge that an oath would be administered to the witness, and that after the
magistrate asked his questions both the Government attorney and the defense counsel
would be permitted to fully question the witness using the format of the Government
going first, followed by cross-examination by the defense, followed by a re-direct by the
Government. The Court found that this procedure was sufficient even though there was
no procedure to compel the witness to answer all questions, the U.S. Court would not be
ruling contemporaneously on objections, and there would not be a real-time transcription.
The Court said that the defendant could later raise arguments regarding admissibility of
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III. RECENT CASES INVOLVING RULE 15 MOTIONS
A. U.S. v. Al Fawwazl9
In 2000, two defendants, Khalid Al Fawwaz and Adel Abdel Bary,
were indicted on terrorism related charges related to conspiring with
Osama bin Laden to kill Americans during embassy bombings in Kenya
and Tanzania. 20  Allegedly, the defendants assisted bin Laden in
establishing a London office for al Qaeda under a front called the Advice
and Reformation Committee ("ARC"), and Fawwaz assisted with the
storing and dissemination of bin Laden's 1996 Declaration of Jihad ("bin
Laden's Declaration"). 2' Both Bary and Fawwaz filed Rule 15 motions
to depose witnesses.
Bary sought to depose Iqbal Ahmed who was in the United Kingdom
and who, along with his UK counsel, had been present when Bary was
question by law enforcement. Ahmed had stated that he was willing to
testify in the United States at trial but Bary filed a Rule 15 motion since
Ahmed's schedule could not be guaranteed.22 Bary also sought to have
his brother, Mohamed, deposed in Cairo, Egypt.23 Bary's brother was
24
expected to testify as to Bary's activities and treatment in Egypt. Bary
admitted that his brother was willing to appear in the United States but
believed Mohamed would be unable to obtain a visa; no denial of a visa
had yet occurred.2 5 The District Court ruled that "speculative concern
that logistics, work, or travel schedules might prevent a witness's
the deposition testimony, if appropriate; See also U.S. v. Little, No. 12 Cr. 647, 2014 WL
1744824, at*2 (S.D.N.Y, Apr. 23, 2014), in which the defendant sought the deposition of
a Swiss resident who was outside subpoena power and who refused to travel to the
United States, even though defendant offered to pay his travel expenses, since the witness
was considered a co-conspirator by the Government. The Government argued that Swiss
law would not permit the witness to be deposed in Switzerland or for his testimony to be
transmitted via live feed during the trial. Citing to prior cases involving depositions taken
in Switzerland, the Court ordered that the deposition was to be taken to the extent
permissible under Swiss law and stated that procedural differences were permissible
"unless the manner of examination required by the law of the host nation is so
incompatible with our own fundamental principles of fairness or so prone to inaccuracy
or bias as to render the testimony inherently unreliable." Id. at *3.
19 See Al Fawwaz, 2014 WL 627083, at *1.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at *2.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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attendance at trial is not sufficient to satisfy the unavailability
requirement."26 As a result, Bary's motion was denied.27
Defendant Al Fawwaz moved to depose nine different individuals in
his Rule 15 motions, six of whom will be discussed herein. The first two
proposed deponents were MI5 agents and he requested the District Court
issue letters rogatory. 28 His motion stated that he had met regularly with
both agents and that they would testify about their interactions with him
and how he had disavowed bin Laden's Declaration, had security
concerns as a dissident, and was advised by one of the agents concerning
his communications with bin Laden and other ARC members. 2 9  Al
Fawwaz's counsel had been unable to get contact information for the two
witnesses. The District Court determined that the proposed testimony
would be material since it was about matters specific to the indictment
against Al Fawwaz such as his interactions with bin Laden and the role
that ARC played, and such testimony was expected to be exculpatory in
nature.30 Further, the District Court explained that the defendant had met
the required showing that the two witnesses were unavailable since al
Fawwaz's counsel had provided information that they had been unable to
even obtain contact information for the witnesses despite their good faith
attempts to do so. 3 ' As a result, the Court granted this Rule 15 motion
and issued letters rogatory to the United Kingdom.32
The third proposed deponent was Naomi Wood who was a rental
agent for the London office leased by ARC.3 3 Al Fawwaz proffered that
Wood would testify that Al Fawwaz's access to the office ended in
February 1998. Again, such testimony would be exculpatory against the
Government's claims that incriminating documents found in late 1998
were in the control of Al Fawwaz.34 Per Al Fawwaz, Wood had refused
to respond to any of his attempts to reach her.35 The District Court
agreed that the "testimony could be material exculpatory evidence with
respect to inculpatory documents" and that Wood's refusal to cooperate
rendered her unavailable; thus the District Court issued letters rogatory
for her deposition.36
26 Id.
27 Id. at *7.
28 Id. at *2
29 Id. (noting that the Government did not oppose this Rule 15 motion).
30 Id.
31 Id. at *3.
32 Id. at *7.
33 Id. at *3.
34 Id. at *3 (noting that the Government did not oppose the request to depose Wood).
35 Id.
36 Id.
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Abdel Bari Atwan, a journalist who wrote about Islamic affairs, was
the fourth proposed deponent.3 7 Al Fawwaz wanted to depose him
regarding his knowledge of the role and activities of dissident groups, as
well as how Al Fawwaz reacted immediately after the publication of bin
Laden's Declaration.38 Atwan refused to travel to the United States to
testify since he previously was denied entry when he requested it to
speak at Brown University.3 9 With respect to Atwan's expected opinion
testimony regarding the ARC, the District Court determined such
testimony was neither material nor admissible.40  In 1999, however,
Atwan provided an affidavit which stated that Al Fawwaz approached
him "in a state of shock . .. literally shaking and said 'I disagree with
it,"' almost immediately after the bin Laden Declaration was published.41
The Government opposed Al Fawwaz's motion on the basis that such
testimony as to what he said to Atwan was inadmissible hearsay.42 The
District Court disagreed, and stated that such testimony was admissible
as a "statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind" under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803.43 Furthermore, Al Fawwaz's alleged
statements disclaiming responsibility or agreement with bin Laden's
Declaration was material because it refuted the Government's claim that
the defendant was involved in disseminated the manifesto.4 4 The District
Court also found that Al Fawwaz had made the requisite showing that
Atwan was unavailable when he stated in his motion that Atwan refused
to travel to the U.S., and even provided the partial basis for such
refusal.45 As a result, the District Court ordered granted the defendant's
request but limited the scope of the deposition specifically to the matters
it had found to be material.46
The fifth proposed witness was Dr. Mustapha Alani, who was
expected to testify regarding his research on dissident organizations and
meetings he had with Al Fawwaz regarding ARC, as well as statements
made by al Fawwaz regarding his disagreement with bin Laden's
Declaration.47 The Court found that such testimony was not material or
admissible.48 , Since Al Fawwaz's statements regarding bin Laden's
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at *4.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
4 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at *7
47 Id. at *5.
48 Id.
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Declaration were not made immediately after its issuance, testimony
regarding such statements would be inadmissible hearsay.4 9 As a result,
the Court denied the defendant's request to depose Alani.50
Abdullah Anas, the seventh proposed deponent, refused to travel to
the United States "without guarantees of his safety."' His proposed
testimony detailed his personal knowledge specific to the role bin Laden
played when bin Laden was a dissident and relief worker prior to bin
Laden's terrorist work.5 2 Anas was also to testify as to the meaning of
giving "bayat," which was a significant issue in the prosecution of Al
Fawwaz. The District Court determined that testimony regarding bin
Laden the dissident versus the terrorist was not exculpatory.53 As for the
testimony regarding "bayat," the District Court found that, even though
the testimony might support Al Fawwaz's defense, there were less
burdensome methods of obtaining evidence as to the definition of
"bayat" for purposes of his defense.54 Additionally, the District Court
found the unavailability of Anas had not been established because no
attempt had been made to ascertain and alleviate the safety concerns in
order to obtain Anas' presence at trial. As a result, the defendant's
Rule 15 motion with respect to Anas was denied.56
B. U.S. v. Moalin5 7
This case involved multiple defendants who jointly filed a Rule 15
motion requesting leave to take the depositions of eight witnesses in
Somalia.5 ' The defendants were charged with multiple terrorism related
offenses including conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists,
conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization,
conspiracy to launder money, providing material support to terrorists and
providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization. 5 9  The
proposed witnesses all had agreed to be deposed in Somalia and were
individuals to whom the Defendant, Moalin, either had transferred funds
49 Id.
50 Id. at *7.
51 Id. at *6.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at *7.
5 Id.
56 Id.
U.S. v. Moalin, No. 10CR4246-JM, 2012 WL 3637370, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
2012).
58 Id. at *1.
59 Id.
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or who had personal knowledge of how the funds transferred from the
defendants had been spent.60
In making its determination to deny the Rule 15 motion, the District
Court applied a detailed analysis of the totality of circumstances which
included whether (1) the witnesses were unavailable for trial, (2) the
motion was timely made, (3) whether the purpose for the deposition was
for use at trial or impermissibly for discovery, (4) whether the proposed
testimony would be material and helpful, (5) the safety of those traveling
to the foreign location in question would be compromised, and (6)
whether "the deposition procedures in the foreign country, as to
reliability and trustworthiness, are compatible with the fundamental
issues of fairness."6 '
With respect to availability, the defendants stated that the witnesses
could not be compelled to travel to the United States and that travel from
Somalia was "not regularly permitted, and is not feasible." 62 However,
defendants provided no evidence that any of the witnesses applied for a
visa or would be denied one if requested, and thus the Court found that
the defendants failed to make good faith efforts to obtain the witnesses'
presence in the United States for trial.63 As a result, the District Court
found this factor went against granting the motion.64
With respect to the issue of timeliness, the defendants first
mentioned the possibility of seeking Rule 15 depositions a year prior.6 5
By the time the motion was filed and set for hearing, a trial continuance
would be required if the request to take the depositions was granted. The
Court found that in light of the defendants "longstanding knowledge"
about the interactions between the witnesses and themselves, the request
was not timely brought.66
The District Court stated that the strongest argument made by the
defendants was that the witnesses would provide exculpatory evidence
that the funds provided by the defendants were not intended to assist any
terrorist network or organization.67 While none of the proposed
witnesses submitted affidavits regarding their anticipated testimony, the
Court relied upon the filed declaration of one of the attorneys regarding
the anticipated testimony.68
60 Id.
61 Id. at *2-*6.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at *3.
66 Id. at *3.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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The District Court next addressed the safety issue. It stated that "the
dangers of travel to Somalia are acute and present risks to both United
States personnel and defense counsel." 69  Since there was a State
Department issued travel warning in place and no State Department
presence in Somalia to assist in the event of an emergency, this factor
weighed "strongly and, in and of itself, decisively against Rule 15
depositions going forward in Somalia."7 0  Furthermore, even the
Defendants' contention that the depositions could take place in a secure
facility adjacent to the airport that was protected by African Union
71
peacekeepers, was not enough to alleviate that concern.
Finally, the Court found that the procedures for the depositions
provided no indicia of reliability. There was no showing that the oath
that would be administered would have the same meaning as oaths in the
United States or under the Hague Convention, or that penalties of perjury
would apply if violated.72 Furthermore, since enforcement of criminal
law in Somalia was non-existent, there could be no trustworthiness even
if penalties of perjury could apply. 73  As a result, the District Court
determined that this factor of reliability and trustworthiness strongly
disfavored granting the Rule 15 motion.74
C. U.S. v. Abu Ghayth75
The defendant was accused of conspiring to kill United States
citizens and other terrorism related charges. Both the Government and
Abu Ghayth filed motions regarding foreign witnesses. The Government
sought to introduce testimony of a confidential witness at trial via closed-
circuit television ("CCTV"), while the defendant moved to take a Rule
15 deposition of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a prior driver of bin Laden's. 76
In its opinion, the District Court noted that the Second Circuit has
applied the standards of Rule 15 in ruling on whether to grant motions
allowing prosecution witnesses to testify via CCTV. The Circuit held
that when the government satisfies the showing required under Rule 15
and trial testimony is allowed via CCTV, the fact that the defendant and
witness are not present in the same room does not violate the
69 Id. at *5.
70 Id. at *6.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
U.S. v. Abu Ghayth, No. S14 98 CRIM. 1023, 2014 WL 144653, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 15, 2014).
76 Id. at *1.
n Id. at *2.
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Confrontation Clause.7 ' This is due to the fact that Rule 15 "facilitates
(1) the giving of testimony under oath; (2) the opportunity for cross-
examination; (3) the ability of the fact-finder to observe demeanor
evidence; and (4) the reduced risk that a witness will wrongfully
implicate an innocent defendant when testifying in his presence." 7 9 As a
result, the Court applied the same Rule 15 standard analysis to both the
Government and defendant's motions.so
With respect to the Government's motion, it was anticipated that its
witness's testimony would be about his personal involvement in a
terrorist plot against the United States that involved detonating
explosives on airplanes.' The witness would also testify that he was
receiving terrorist training at a camp at the same time the defendant gave
speeches there.8 2 The District Court ruled that the Government had met
its burden to show the testimony would be material and inculpatory
against Abu Ghayth.8 3 Furthermore, the Government provided evidence
showing that the witness was refusing to travel to the United States to
testify since he feared he would be arrested if he entered the country, and
that such fear was reasonable since both the witness and prosecutors
were notified that the witness would, in fact, be arrested upon arrival.8 4
The District Court held that this met the required showing for
unavailability, and that a good faith requirement does not obligate the
government to extradite a defendant, when possible, as argued by the
defendant in his opposition papers. 5  As a result, the Government's
motion for the trial testimony to be offered through CCTV was granted.8 6
With respect to Abu Ghayth's motion, he argued that Hamdan would
testify that he spent much time with bin Laden, met Abu Ghayth various
times, and that he never observed Abu Ghayth engaging in any of the
acts contained in the indictment or in possession of a brevity card. 7
Furthermore, Hamdan would testify that he does not believe Abu Ghayth
swore an oath to al Qaeda, and that brevity cards contained the names of
both inner circle al Qaeda members as well as non-al Qaeda
individuals." The District Court determined that some of the proposed
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at *3.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at *4.
87 Id. at *2. Brevity cards supposedly contained coded names and locations for
individuals who may or may not have been al Qaeda members.
88 Id.
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testimony was exculpatory, but other parts were irrelevant or
inadmissible. For example, the fact that Hamdan never heard Abu
Ghayth take an oath or saw him engage in the accused activities does not
mean they did not occur outside Hamdan's presence; thus, this would not
be material exculpatory evidence.89 Similarly, any statement Abu
Ghayth may have made to Hamdan regarding his reasons for being
present in Afghanistan would be inadmissible hearsay. 90 However,
testimony that a person's inclusion on a brevity card does not equate with
membership in al Qaeda would directly offset the Government's
contention that such inclusion is probative of Abu Ghayth's guilt.9 '
Additionally, Hamdan's testimony that the camps were almost
exclusively used for training individuals to fight against the Northern
Alliance was material for countering the Government's claims that the
camps were solely "in furtherance of a conspiracy to kill Americans." 9 2
The District Court also determined that Abu Ghayth had shown that he
requested Hamdan travel to the United States to testify and had offered to
pay all associated travel expenses, yet Hamdan had refused to travel to
the United States and might even be legally barred from entering the
country; thus, Abu Ghayth had met his burden of showing Hamdan was
unavailable under Rule 15.93 While the Government raised the
argument that there was no means to ensure truthful testimony from a
person in Yemen, the District Court specifically stated that the
Government could use the "lack of a viable enforcement mechanism
against Hamdan to impeach his credibility." 94 As a result of its analysis,
the District Court granted Abu Ghayth's motion with the conditions that
the deposition take place over CCTV, each side be given three hours to
question the witness, and the topics be limited to brevity cards, the
purpose of the training camps Abu Ghayth visited, and testimony as to
the defendant's role in al Qaeda. 9 5  The Court also noted that the
Government would still have the opportunity to move to limit or exclude
the deposition testimony at trial using any appropriate grounds including
that of materiality.96
89 Id. at *3.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at *4.
95 Id.
96 Id.
[Vol. VI: 109
2015-16] FED. RULE OF CRIM PROCEDURE 15 AND TERRORISM CASES
D. U.S. v. Mostafa9 7
Defendant Mostafa Kamel Mostafa a/k/a Abu Hamza al-Masri was
indicted for numerous terrorism related charges.9 8 The Government filed
a motion requesting Saajid Badat be permitted to testify via CCTV or,
alternatively, by Rule 15 deposition.99 Badat had refused to come to the
United States to testify but had agreed to provide testimony under oath
via CCTV.'00
The District Court began its analysis with a discussion of the
Confrontation Clause. The Court addressed how the right to
confrontation promotes justice by advancing "the pursuit of truth in
criminal trials" through the use of the witness oath, cross-examination
and the jury's ability to observe the demeanor of the witness.' 0 ' The
District Court emphasized, however, that the right to a face-to-face
meeting was not a requirement.102
The District Court proceeded to identify the five requirements
created by Rule 15(c)(3), as listed hereinabove and in the rule itself.1 0 3
The Court also noted that there was a substantial record of courts
approving testimony via CCTV for both taking depositions and for trial
proceedings; the Court even stated that CCTV provides trier of fact with
an opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and that the Supreme
Court appeared to be in favor of its use.10 4
Applying the requirements of Rule 15(c)(3), the District Court first
determined that the proposed testimony would provide substantial proof
of material facts. For example, Badat was expected to testify as to the
leadership structure, background of jihadist training camps, and camp
locations, which were material and relevant to the charges of the
indictment that the defendant "facilitate[ed] violent jihad in
Afghanistan. 0 5
Next, the Court found that the Government had met its burden to
show Badat was unavailable for either trial or deposition in the United
States. The reasons cited included that: Badat was a citizen of the United
Kingdom who had criminal charges pending against him in the United
States, that he believed he would be arrested upon arrival in the United
States, and it was confirmed that the United States would not give him
97 U.S. v. Mostafa, 14 F.Sup.3d 515, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
98 Id. at 517.
99 Id. at 517-518.
100 Id. at 518.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 519 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 520-521.
105 Id. at 522.
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safe passage. 10 6 The defendant argued that this made the Government
"complicit in Badat's unavailability" and that the Govermment had not
made a good faith attempt to obtain Badat's presence in the United
States, because in effect it was the Government that was preventing his
presence. 0 7  The District Court disagreed, stating that it would not
interfere with or second-guess decisions regarding extradition and safe
passage, which are the Government's decisions to make.'s Since
Mostafa's main contention appeared to be that allowing Badat to testify
remotely would prevent Mostafa from being able to probe "the benefits
that the witness may have obtained or been promised" in exchange for
his testimony, the District Court emphasized that counsel for Mostafa
would be permitted to ask questions regarding the cooperation agreement
in place between Badat and United Kingdom authorities, as well as any
related benefits.1 09
As a result of the foregoing analysis, the District Court found that the
Government had met the requirements to prove "exceptional
circumstances" existed under Rule 15.110 The District Court ordered that
the Government's motion to permit Badat to testify via CCTV was
granted with the following conditions to be followed: first, that Badat be
bound by an oath subjecting him to the penalty of perjury in the United
States and second, that the cameras be positioned so that the jury could
see Badat's face and he could see the jurors' faces along with the
defendant and the questioner as he testified."'
E. U.S. v. Ahmedll 2
This case involves a group of defendants charged with terrorism
related crimes including, but not limited to, providing material support to
al-Shabaab, conspiring to provide material support to al-Shabaab, and
receiving military-style training from al-Shabaab.11 3 The Government
106 Id.
1o7 Id. at 523.
'os Id. at 524.
109 Id. at 523.
110 Id. at 524.
1 Id. It should be noted that in his filed (Opposition to the Government's motion
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Government's Motion, U.S. v. Mostafa, 14
F.Sup.3d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 04 Cr 356), 2014 WL 5111546.), Mostafa expressed
his preference for "live" CCTV trial testimony over a Rule 15 deposition. It also should
be noted that Mostafa was convicted and has since filed an appeal. The initial brief is not
yet due and has yet to be filed. It is unknown whether the ruling to permit Badat to testify
via CCTV will be one of the grounds for his appeal.
112 U.S. v. Ahmed, No. 12-CR-661 SLT S-2, 2014 WL 7399298, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
30, 2014).
113 Id. (noting that al-Shabaabz is a designated foreign terrorist organization).
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filed a Rule 15(c)(3) motion for permission to take the depositions of two
witnesses outside the United States and outside the presence of the
defendants."14
The District Court stated that a "criminal defendant must have a
meaningful opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him in order
to show bias or improper motive for their testimony."' It then began its
analysis of the requirements under Rule 15(c)(3). First, the District
Court ruled that the proposed testimony "could provide substantial proof
of material facts" in this situation since the witnesses had personal
knowledge of the conduct of one or more defendant's activities in
relation to the charges of the indictment.11 6 Second, the Government was
unable to secure the witnesses' presence in the United States for either
trial or deposition, despite its efforts, since the witnesses were in the
custody of a foreign government that would not permit them to travel to
the United States to testify. The Court also noted that the proposed
witnesses might not be permitted to enter the United States due to their
criminal convictions.1 1 7  Third, the Court found that the in-custody
defendants could not travel abroad to the location of the deposition since
secure transportation and continuing custody could not be guaranteed."'
Finally, the procedures outlined by the Government assured the Court
that the defendants would be able to meaningfully participate. "9 Such
procedures included that the witnesses would testify under oath with
counsel for each defendant present on location while each defendant
attended "virtually" via live video feed with counsel in New York.
Additionally, defendants would be able to communicate with their on-
site counsel.1 20 Finally, a videographer and stenographer would record
the proceedings and the Government would pay the costs for the
defendants' attorneys to attend the depositions on site.12' The Court
therefore granted the Government's Rule 15 motion in this case.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.; see also United States v. Ahmed, No. 12-CR-661 SLT S-2, 2015 WL 2084628,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2015), where the defendants later moved to suppress the
deposition testimony of the two witnesses on the basis that the testimony was unreliable
since the witnesses were originally subjected to torture when first taken into custody by
the foreign government. While evidence collected through torture is deemed inherently
untrustworthy, the Court found that there was no indication that the torture that had
occurred years before had colored the witnesses' testimony. In fact, attorneys for the
defendants had been given the opportunity to question the witnesses to determine the
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IV. CONCLUSION
As shown above, the current case law reflects that the courts are very
willing to utilize Rule 15(c)(3) to permit foreign depositions outside the
presence of defendants as long as certain, now-routine procedures are in
place. Interestingly, the recent decisions also indicate a trend toward
using the same analysis to permit live CCTV trial testimony from a
foreign location. Notably, Rule 15 has been used with success by both
defendants and prosecutors, often over opposing counsel's objections.
Ultimately, Mostafa, which is on appeal, may shed more light on the
intended direction and possible expanded use of Rule 15. In the
meantime, Courts appear relatively consistent in their approach to
analyzing whether the requirements of Rule 15 are met. This does not
mean that differences have not occurred when applying the analysis to
the particular facts of a case, particularly regarding certain nuances
regarding availability, but most of the differences likely have and will
continue to occur with respect to determining when foreign procedures
meet the threshold for ensuring the reliability of the testimony at issue
and the meaningful participation of a defendant in the process. What is
clear is that Rule 15 will continue to be an invaluable tool that Article III
courts use with respect to balancing the interests and rights of the
Government and defendants in terrorism trials.
reliability of their testimony, and each witness had repeatedly, credibly and consistently
indicated to each of the three defense counsel that such witness was testifying voluntarily.
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